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CAUSATION AND CIVIL
RICO STANDING:
WHEN IS A PLAINTIFF INJURED "BY
REASON OF" A RICO VIOLATION?
LAURA GINGER*
INTRODUCTION
Among the remedies included by Congress in the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),' is a private
right of action for treble damages available to "[a]ny person in-
jured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 " 2 of the Act. Thus, to have standing to sue under civil RICO,
a private plaintiff must prove injury to business or property "by
reason of" a RICO violation. This requirement poses a question of
causation: what nexus between the plaintiff's injury and the de-
fendant's RICO violation must exist before one can say that the
injury occurred "by reason of" the violation? 3
The meaning of the phrase "by reason of" in this context, has
proved problematic. The statute provides no guidance as to its
proper interpretation, and the courts have been unable to fashion a
uniform or comprehensible definition. The United States Supreme
Court's decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,4 which dealt in
part with civil RICO standing requirements, did not clearly iden-
tify the subsections of section 1962 to which its holding applied; it
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Business. B.A.
1976; DePauw University, J.D. 1979, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
2 Id. § 1964(c) (1988).
3 See Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 636 (2d Cir. 1989) ("by
reason of" requires causal connection between proscribed conduct and plaintiff's injury);
Ocean Energy H, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 744 (5th Cir. 1989)
(must employ traditional causation analysis in determining whether RICO plaihtiff injured
"by reason of" § 1962 violation); Grantham & Mann, Inc., v. American Safety Prods., Inc.,
831 F.2d 596, 606 (6th Cir. 1987) ("by reason of" language imposes causation requirement of
conduct that violated § 1962 and directly or indirectly injured plaintiff's business or
property).
4 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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therefore left unanswered many important questions regarding
standing.5 Moreover, the Court's recent denial of certiorari in a
case presenting that precise issue avoided an opportunity to clarify
the Sedima decision.'
Left to their own devices, the lower federal courts have dif-
fered as to the type of causal nexus between a plaintiff's injury and
a defendant's racketeering activities which is required for civil
RICO standing. Some courts have fashioned causation rules which
apply generally to private civil RICO actions,7 while others have
developed rules which apply only to certain classes of plaintiffs8 or
to particular subsections of section 1962.9 As a result, the current
state of the law in this area remains in an extreme state of chaos.
These conflicting lower court decisions have, in effect, re-
stricted the class of private plaintiffs entitled to recover under
RICO. This restriction neither comports with the language in
Sedima'° nor satisfies those who would prefer to see civil RICO's
current strength and availability preserved. However, other courts
and commentators applaud the limitation of private civil RICO
suits.': As a result, each of the conflicting approaches, if formally
implemented, would have a significant, if differing, impact on the
Act's standing requirements. Although few RICO reformers di-
rectly consider the requisite type of causation, various proposals
have been made elsewhere to amend the Act's standing
requirements. 2
This Article will explore the issue of causation and civil RICO
standing from several perspectives. In examining the various judi-
cial interpretations of the statutory language, this Article will give
particular attention to the Supreme Court's discussion in the
Sedima case, as well as to the varying rules developed by the lower
courts. Moreover, this Article will provide an analysis of current
reform proposals and advocate that the RICO statute be amended
to implement a definite and clear standing rule.
See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
C See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
S See infra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 48-64, 100-02 and accompanying text.
'2 See infra notes 105-133 and accompanying text.
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1990] CAUSATION AND CIVIL RICO STANDING
I. STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON STANDING: SECTION 1964(c)
Section 1964(c) 3 creates a private civil right of action in favor
of anyone who has been "injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962.' Only those persons injured
"by reason of a violation of section 1962" have standing to sue
under civil RICO.16 The phrase "by reason of" generally has been
interpreted to impose a requirement on plaintiffs16 to prove that
the criminal conduct violating section 1962 proximately caused in-
jury to the plaintiff's business or property. 17
Civil RICO's standing requirement has proved elusive in its
application. Courts have failed to agree upon the requisite causal
link between the defendant's RICO violation and the plaintiff's
15 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). Section 1964(c) states: "Any person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in
any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the danages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
14 Id.; see id. § 1962. Section 1962, containing RICO's criminal provisions, makes it
unlawful for any person:
(a). . . who has received any income derived. . . from a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has
participated as a principal... to use or invest.., any part of such income...
in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enter-
prise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce . ...
(b) . . . through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt to acquire or maintain... any interest in or control of any enter-
prise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
(c) . . . employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the ac-
tivities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate
• in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) . . . to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or
(c) of this section.
Id.
16 See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (plaintiff has standing only if injury to business or
property caused by conduct violating § 1962).
" See, e.g., Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1214 (5th Cir. 1988) (" 'by
reason of' in § 1964(c) imposes a proximate causation requirement on plaintiffs"); Sperber v.
Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1988) ("both direct and indirect injuries must be proxi-
mately caused"); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th
Cir. 1984) (" 'by reason of' language. . . simply imposes a proximate cause requirement on
plaintiffs"), afl'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); see also Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task
Force, A.B.A. SEc. CoRp., BANKING & Bus. LAW 288 (1985) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
17 Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398; see Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Prods., Inc.,
831 F.2d 596, 606 (6th Cir. 1987) (1962 violation must injure plaintiff's business or prop-
erty); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 834 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(quoting Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398).
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harm; 18 nor have they uniformly resolved the kind of RICO viola-
tion necessary to cause the plaintiff's injury. Is it sufficient, for
purposes of standing under civil RICO, for the plaintiff to suffer
from the predicate acts alone? Must he be injured by the pattern
of racketeering resulting from those acts? Must the injury occur
through the use of that patterned racketeering activity in the par-
ticular way that section 1962 declares unlawful? 19
Section 1964(c) of RICO does not directly answer any of these
questions. Therefore, orie must resort to the case law decisions in-
terpreting section 1964(c) to resolve the issue of the standing nec-
essary to file a civil RICO claim.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 1964(c)
A. The United States Supreme Court
Sedima remains the Court's sole response to the question of
civil RICO standing.20 In particular, the Court examined two spe-
cific restrictions imposed by the circuit courts on RICO standing.
18 See City of Milwaukee v. Universal Mortgage Corp., 692 F. Supp. 992, 996 (E.D. Wis.
1988).
19 See, e.g., Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 1989)
(standing under § 1962(a) requires injury by use or investment of racketeering income, not
merely injury caused by predicate acts, while standing under § 1962(c) requires only proof
of injury caused by predicate acts), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1990); Cullom, 859 F.2d at
1215 (standing exists if plaintiff injured by "racketeering activities forbidden by § 1962")
(footnote omitted); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1184, 1187, 1189 n.11 (4th Cir.
1988) (standing under all subsections of § 1962 requires injury caused by predicate acts);
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988) (standing under subsec-
tions of § 1962 requires injury from predicate acts), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1642 (1989);
Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1067 (3d Cir. 1988)
(standing under § 1962 requires injury caused by some or all of predicate acts), aff'd, 110 S.
Ct. 701 (1990); Town of Kearney v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263,
1268 (3d Cir. 1987) (injury which confers standing on RICO plaintiff is injury flowing from
predicate act, not injury flowing from pattern of such acts); City of Milwaukee, 692 F. Supp.
at 997 (recovery under RICO limited to injuries caused by predicate acts); Mid-State Fertil-
izer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 693 F. Supp. 666, 672 (N.D. IlM. 1988) (same), aff'd, 877
F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1989); P.M.F. Servs., Inc. v. Grady, 681 F. Supp. 549, 556 (N.D. IM. 1988)
(specific subsection makes violation of racketeering activity alone, but use of racketeering
activity in particular way subsection declares unlawful); Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot &
Mannion, P.C., 670 F. Supp. 597, 599 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (standing hinges on plaintiff's suffer-
ing" 'direct injury'" by conduct violating § 1962), aff'd, 897 F.2d 522 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 47 (1990); Kouvakas v. Inland Steel Co., 646 F. Supp. 474, 477 (N.D. Ind. 1986)
(plaintiff without standing because injuries did not flow from predicate acts); see also Task
Force Report, supra note 16, at 288 & nn.439-40 (discussing both sides of issue); infra notes
47-50 and accompanying text.
2 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479.
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One required the RICO plaintiff to establish a so-called "racketeer-
ing injury" in addition to an injury resulting from the predicate
acts.2'
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. It ruled that a civil
RICO plaintiff need not additionally prove, for standing purposes,
an indirect "racketeering injury" not immediately resulting from
the commission of the predicate acts, once having proved a direct
injury caused by the predicate acts.22 In so doing, the Court argua-
bly expanded standing under RICO by including both plaintiffs
suffering a direct injury from the predicate acts and those suffering
an indirect injury. 3
The Sedima Court addressed only the specific requirements of
section 1962(c) standing, stating that "[w]here the plaintiff alleges
each element of the violation, the compensable injury necessarily is
the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute
a pattern .... Any recoverable damages occurring by reason of a
violation of § 1962(c) will flow from the commission of the
21 Id. at 485. The district court in Sedima held that a RICO complaint must allege an
injury apart from that resulting directly from the predicate acts alleged. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed; the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege an injury both "dif-
ferent in kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves," and "caused
by an activity which RICO was designed to deter." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d
482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984).
:' Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495.
23 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at 14, 43-45, Diamond v. Reynolds, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988) (decision with-
out published opinion), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988) [hereinafter Petition for Certio-
rari]. The Court, in denying review stated that its Sedima decision granted RICO standing
to those victims directly injured by the predicate acts. "But all nine justices agreed that
those victims injured indirectly by the racketeering; i.e., those with 'racketeering injury,'
'indirect injury,' or 'competitive injury' had standing, and would continue to have standing,
under RICO." Id. at 12. One district court has interpreted Sedima in the following manner:
While the defendants assert that the indirect injuries alleged by the [plaintiff]
... are not the type of injury contemplated by section 1964(c), there is no indica-
tion of such a limitation in the Sedima case. Indeed, the issue confronted in
Sedima was not whether indirect injury from the racketeering enterprise was re-
coverable but whether direct injury from the predicate acts was sufficient to allow
recovery. The Court implicitly accepted the premise that the injurious
consequences of the enterprise other than the injury directly attributable to the
fraudulent acts themselves would be recoverable.
Philatelic Found. v. Kaplan, No. 85-8571 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file) (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 & n.15 ) (emphasis added), rev'd on other grounds,
647 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (cases
upholding "directly or indirectly" related business injuries).
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predicate acts. ' 24 Its broad language, however, can easily be ap-
plied to violations of any subsection of section 1962.25
The Court in Sedima seems to have included injuries caused
either directly or indirectly by the predicate acts in its definition of
"recoverable damages," for it states that "[s]uch damages include,
but are not limited to, the sort of competitive injury for which the
dissenters would allow recovery. ' 26 The majority's reference al-
ludes to the examples offered by dissenting Justice Marshall 27 in
an effort to illustrate the significance and necessity of a "racketeer-
ing injury," which the dissenters would have additionally required
for RICO standing. However, the Court found fault with the dis-
sent's reasoning:
Under the dissent's reading of the statute, the harm proximately
[directly] caused by the forbidden conduct is not compensable,
but that ultimately and indirectly flowing therefrom is. We reject
this topsy-turvy approach, finding no warrant in the language or
the history of the statute for denying recovery thereunder to "the
direct victims of the [racketeering] activity," post, at 522, while
preserving it for the indirect.2s
" Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497.
21 See Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 693 F. Supp. 666, 671 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (broad language in Sedima opinion indicates injury caused by predicate racketeering
acts is "sufficient for any type of § 1962 violation"), aff'd, 877 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1989).
28 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 n.15; see Bass v. Campagnone, 838 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir.
1988). The Bass court explained that the Supreme Court "made clear that damages could be
recovered for those injuries indirectly caused by predicate acts, as well as those directly
caused by them." Id.
17 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 521-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The "racketeering injuries"
mentioned in the examples appear to illustrate primarily anticompetitive effects of racke-
teering. They include being forced out of business by monopolization resulting from threats,
arson, and assault; being forced to pay more for the monopolist's goods or services, resulting
in added costs of doing business; being forced to pay protection money, purchase certain
goods, or hire certain workers, resulting in added costs; being displaced as an investor in a
legitimate business by a racketeer who gains control of the business through racketeering;
and losing competitive position to an enterprise which enhances its profits or its economic
power, and therefore its competitive position, through racketeering. Id. (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Justice Marshall would permit recovery for such indirect "racketeering injury," but
would deny recovery for any of the injuries resulting directly from the predicate acts perpe-
trated by the racketeers in his examples. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). He would not permit
recovery, for instance, for the cost of the building burned in the arson, for injury resulting
from the threats or assault, or for monetary injuries suffered by the customers or investors
in the racketeer-infiltrated business. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Under his scheme, the
direct targets and victims of the predicate acts "could recover for damages flowing from the
predicate acts themselves, but under state or perhaps other federal law, not RICO." Id. at
521 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 497 n.15. A number of courts have agreed with the Supreme Court's analysis in
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Sedima, therefore, can appropriately be understood as holding that
,plaintiffs injured either directly or indirectly by racketeering ac-
tivity have standing to bring a private civil RICO suit. The Court
has, in its broad interpretation, expanded RICO standing to in-
clude those plaintiffs suffering direct injury alone, as well as those
suffering indirect injuries.2 e
One should not view the majority's ruling in Sedima as affect-
ing the standing of those suffering indirect injury. The lower fed-
eral courts, however, sharply disagree on whether the Sedima deci-
sion stripped "indirect injury" RICO victims of standing.30 The
Supreme Court, unfortunately, declined an opportunity to settle
this conflict and clarify its Sedima ruling. In November of 1988,
the Court denied certiorari in Diamond v. Reynolds,31 a case which
squarely presented the issue of whether that Court's expansion of
RICO standing in Sedima simultaneously eliminated RICO stand-
ing for those who had suffered indirect injury.32 In Diamond, a for-
mer corporate chief financial officer alleged that he was fired be-
cause he opposed the plan of certain corporate directors to control
the corporation through illegal racketeering activities in violation
of RICO.3
The district court held that the plaintiff "did not have stand-
ing under Sedima, as he was not injured. . . 'by the conduct con-
stituting the [RICO] violation.'-34 In reaching this conclusion, the
court reasoned that the discharge in itself cannot be considered
"conduct constituting a violation of RICO," and that the share-
holders, as the persons injured by the racketeering acts, "alone
have standing to bring a RICO action containing the type of allega-
tions made by plaintiff. 35
Sedima. See, e.g., Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp. 1430, 1433 (N.D. IlM. 1986) (RICO
action limited to "direct victims" of predicate acts would ignore essence of RICO violation).
20 See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 23, at 14.
3o Id. at 16. Some courts have interpreted the Court's language arguably in error, to
grant RICO standing only to those suffering direct injury. See, e.g., National Enters. Inc. v.
Mellon Fin. Servs., 847 F.2d 251, 253 (5th Cir. 1988) (whether indirect injury sufficient for
standing is contested question among federal courts); Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639,
641 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (division of authority reflects disagreement among circuits).
488 U.S. 955 (1988).
32 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 23, at i.
33 Diamond v. Reynolds, No. 31580 at 86 (D. Del. July 15, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds
library); Petition for Certiorari, supra note 23, at 6-10.
11 Diamond, No. 31580 at 87 (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496); Petition for Certiorari,
supra note 23, at 11.
35 Diamond, No. 31580 at 87.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision on the basis of its own reading
of Sedima, and stated:
[W]hether Diamond was discharged in retaliation for objecting to
the alleged conspiracy or to prevent him from reporting the con-
spiracy, he does not have RICO standing. Diamond was not a tar-
get-either directly or indirectly-of the alleged criminal con-
duct, and his discharge cannot provide the basis for RICO
standing. The district court properly held that Diamond's dis-
charge was not sufficiently linked to the predicate acts that com-
prised the pattern of racketeering activity.36
Diamond petitioned the United States Supreme Court for re-
view, arguing that the differing interpretations among the circuits
required resolution.3 7 The Court, however, denied certiorari,38 leav-
ing Sedima as the only guidance to the lower courts.
B. Standing After Sedima in the Federal Courts
Some federal courts have regarded Sedima's standing ruling as
applicable to any and all subsections of section 1962 of RICO,3"
while other courts would restrict that holding to cases involving
claims based on subsection 1962(c).40 This confusion has led to dif-
fering standards among the courts which promotes neither clarity,
uniformity, nor predictability in the law.
In addition, the substance of the Sedima Court's standing rul-
ing remains unclear. For example, the Court's requirement that re-
coverable damages "flow from the commission of the predicate
acts '41 does not articulate the meaning of the phrase "flow from."
I6 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 23, app. A, at 9-10 (citations and footnote
omitted).
37 Id. at 14. Diamond asserted that certiorari should be granted to resolve the conflict
among nine circuits as to whether victims with "racketeering injury," also known as "indi-
rect injury," have RICO standing; because the decision below holding that Sedima restricted
RICO standing conflicts with this Court's decision in Sedima; and because the fact pattern
in this case, an employee fired for opposing RICO violations, is being frequently presented
to the federal courts and is resulting in conflicting decisions. Id. at 14, 37.
38 Diamond v. Reynolds, 488 U.S. 955 (1988).
8' See, e.g., Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 693 F. Supp. 666, 671
(N.D. Ill. 1988) ("injury caused by predicate racketeering acts is sufficient for any type of
§ 1962 violation), afl'd, 877 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1989).
0 See, e.g., Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir.) (criteria
required for standing to bring claim under § 1962(c) different from that required under
§ 1962(a)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1989).
"I Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497.
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Since the gist of the Court's standing ruling in Sedima was to con-
fer RICO standing on those alleging only a direct injury from the
predicate acts,42 it seems that "flow from" should include damages
directly resulting from the predicate acts. Furthermore, the Court's
next statement that these damages "include, but are not limited
to" 43 damages from competitive injury, indicates that damages in-
directly caused by the predicate acts are also recoverable. The ob-
vious issue left open by the Sedima Court is the degree to which a
relationship between the plaintiff's damages and the defendant's
predicate acts may be indirect and still confer civil RICO standing
on the plaintiff.
Moreover, the Court's statements concerning compensable in-
jury4 and the essential violation 45 imply that perhaps standing ex-
ists only for those injured by the pattern of racketeering, 4" or by
the use of that racketeering activity in the particular way declared
unlawful by the subsection of section 1962 at issue in a particular
case.
47
The uncertainty bred by the Sedima decision has resulted in a
proliferation of RICO standing rules in the lower federal courts.
Some courts have developed standing rules of general applicability,
while others have devised rules applicable specifically to certain re-
curring fact patterns, or to particular subsections of section 1962.
Thus, the allegations and proof required to obtain civil RICO
standing depend to a large extent upon the jurisdiction in which
one commences his RICO action.
42 Id. at 497 n.15.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 497 ("harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a
pattern").
45 Id. ("essence of the violation is the commission of those acts in connection with the
conduct of an enterprise").
46 See, e.g., Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 96 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (§
1964(c) requires plaintiff to be injured by at least two acts-pattern of racketeering activ-
ity). Contra Town of Kearney v. Hudson Meadows.Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263,
1268 (3d Cir. 1987) (injury must flow from commission of predicate act, not pattern of such
acts); Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1987) (illogical to
require plaintiff to show all acts equalling pattern causing injury).
'4 See, e.g., PM.F. Servs., Inc., v. Grady, 681 F. Supp. 549, 556 (N.D. IMI. 1988) ("spe-
cific subsection of Section 1962 makes the violation not the conduct of racketeering activity
alone, but rather the use of that racketeering activity in the particular way the subsection
declares unlawful").
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1. Generally Applicable Theories of Causation
a. The direct-indirect injury test
Although most federal courts consider whether the defend-
ant's predicate acts injured plaintiff directly, some courts grant
standing on the basis of either direct or indirect injury. For exam-
ple, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has held that for standing to exist, "[t]he criminal conduct in vio-
lation of section 1962 must, directly or indirectly, have injured the
plaintiff's business or property. '48 It would appear that an indirect
injury is sufficient to grant RICO standing and some courts have
agreed with this view. 49 However, a clear majority of the courts has
held that only plaintiffs directly injured by the predicate acts have
standing to sue under civil RICO. 50
48 Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984)
(emphasis added), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). This language was cited with approval by the
same court in Flip Side Prods., Inc. v. Jam Prods., Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024, 1035 (7th Cir.),,cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988).
'9 See, e.g., Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1988) (some kinds of indirect
injury are recoverable, including" 'racketeering' injury, 'competitive injury' or injury caused
by the total effect of the pattern of racketeering in the enterprise"); Grantham & Mann, Inc.
v. American Safety Prods., Inc., 831 F.2d 596, 606 (6th Cir. 1987) ("criminal conduct in
violation of section 1962 must, directly or indirectly, have injured plaintiff's business or
property") (quoting Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 29
(1st Cir. 1987) (recovery not limited to direct victims); Miller v. Glen & Helen Aircraft, 777
F.2d 496, 498-99 (9th Cir. 1985) (sufficient causal connection allegation that investigator
conspiracy caused portion of insurance proceeds to be paid to investigator, thereby deplet-
ing final settlement to plaintiff); Terre du Lac Ass'n v. Terre du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467, 472
(8th Cir. 1985) (standing exists even where plaintiff not alleged target of racketeering activ-
ity only alleges indirect injury), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398
(criminal conduct must, directly or indirectly, injure plaintiff's business or property); Alex-
ander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 411 (8th Cir. 1984) (accounting
firm's lost fees, expenses of investigation, and loss of business reputation sufficient to confer
RICO standing), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Lewis v. Lhu, 696 F. Supp. 723, 727
(D.D.C. 1988) (standing only requires allegation that plaintiffs' injuries "flowed, directly or
indirectly, from defendants' fraudulent acts"); Williams v. Hall; 683 F. Supp. 639, 642 (E.D.
Ky. 1988) (indirect injury sufficient basis under § 1962(a) or (c)); Wooten v. Loshbough, 649
F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (no statutory requirement that plaintiff be victim of
predicate acts); Acampora v. Boise Cascade Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D.N.J. 1986) (stand-
ing extended to employee discharged for discovering manager's thefts because "[h]er injury,
however, flowed from defendant's commission of a pattern of racketeering activity in con-
nection with the conduct of an enterprise"); Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp. 1430,
1433 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (extending standing only to direct victims of predicate racketeering
activities would be to ignore essence of RICO violation); SJ Advanced Technology v.
Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572, 576 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (injured competitor had standing even
though predicate acts directed at third parties).
50 See, e.g., Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 636 (2d. Cir. 1989)
(no standing without causal connection between plaintiff's refusal to participate in predicate
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Several circuit courts have disapproved of using the direct-in-
direct injury dichotomy to frame the RICO standing question. In
Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Industries,51 the Eighth Circuit
held that an accounting firm claiming that its former client falsi-
fied audit data had standing based on injury it suffered from the
costs attendant to a Securities and Exchange Commission investi-
gation, lost fees, and injury to its business reputation.2 The court
disapproved of the Seventh Circuit's narrow construction of RICO
standing because of the lack of legislative history supporting the
direct-indirect dichotomy.53 On remand, the court readopted this
standing ruling and commented on the impact of the Sedima deci-
sion, which had been rendered in the interim, stating that "[t]he
brief mention of causation in Sedima cannot fairly be interpreted
as reading into section 1964(c) a direct injury versus indirect injury
acts and alleged constructive discharge); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527,
529 (2d Cir. 1989) (plaintiff must show damage to business or property resulted from predi-
cate acts constituting violation); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1215, 1217
(5th Cir. 1988) (whistleblowers fired for reporting RICO violation or for refusing to partici-
pate in RICO violation lack standing because discharge does not "flow from predicate
acts"); National Enters., Inc. v. Mellon Fin. Servs., 847 F.2d 251, 254-55 (5th Cir. 1988)
(creditor of RICO victim lacked standing because alleged injury not caused by predicate
acts); Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir. 1987)
(whistleblower plaintiff lacks standing because acts that injured him not caused by alleged
predicate acts); Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 1987)
(minority shareholders of defunct bank injured by decline in value of bank stock lack stand-
ing in non-derivative action without direct, personal injury distinct from corporation's), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988); Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1987)
(plaintiff fired for reporting illegal scheme lacks standing because discharge not violation;
RICO provides no cause of action to "individuals injured by acts other than criminal RICO
violations"); Marshall & flsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d. 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff
must prove direct injury from at least one of predicate acts constituting RICO pattern);
NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931, 937 (4th Cir. 1987) (corporation not stockholders
have standing because "indirectly injured party should look to the recovery of the directly
injured party, not the wrongdoer for relief"); Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843,
849 (2d Cir.) (shareholders lacked standing because RICO action is corporate asset), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986); Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1985) (taxpayers
paying higher county taxes lack standing to recover for defendant's bribery of county offi-
cials); Warren v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 759 F.2d 542, 545 (6th Cir. 1985) (shareholder
and discharged employee of corporation forced into bankruptcy by RICO violations lacked
standing because only corporation suffered injuries directly caused by RICO violations).
81 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded for further consideration in
light of Sedima and Haroco, 473 U.S. 922 (1985), standing ruling readopted on remand,
770 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
82 Id. at 411-12.
11 Id. at 412; see Cenco v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 459 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
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distinction."54
The First Circuit, in Bass v. Campagnone,55 has questioned
the validity of the direct-indirect distinction for the following
reason
Sedima, then, establishes a broad standard for determining when
a person is injured "by reason of' a section 1962 violation: the
inquiry in [sic] not whether the plaintiff has alleged a direct or
indirect injury, but rather whether he or she has alleged an injury
that "flows from" the predicate acts. 6
Neither the Alexander Grant nor the Bass court, however,
proposed an alternative to the rejected direct-indirect injury test.
The Alexander Grant court merely stated that the plaintiff, Grant,
had standing to allege its claims.57 The Bass court similarly failed
to elaborate upon its statement that the plaintiff's injury must
"flow from" the predicate acts. 8
b. Proximate cause
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the direct-indirect injury test,
but suggested an alternative proximate causation analysis. In
Zervas v. Faulkner,5" the court rejected a strictly direct nexus be-
tween the injury and a predicate as "overly restrictive. 60 However,
the weight of authority did not support mere "but for causation."
After discussing the decisions of several other circuits that impose-
a requirement of proximate causation, the Fifth Circuit in Zervas
explicitly adopted proximate cause as an additional requirement.61
Similarly, many other courts extend civil RICO standing only to
those plaintiffs whose injuries were proximately caused by the de-
fendant's predicate acts. 2 Indeed, in Sedima, the Supreme Court
Alexander Grant, 770 F.2d at 719 (interpreting Sedima).
55 838 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988).
16 Id. at 12.
11 Alexander Grant, 770 F.2d at 719.
58 Bass, 838 F.2d at 12.
"9 861 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1988).
0 Id. at 833.
6' Id. at 834-35.
See Ocean Energy II, Inc. v. Alexander and Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 744 (5th
Cir. 1989) (plaintiff harmed "by reason of" RICO violation must prove proximate causation
between predicate acts and injury); Old Time Enters. v. International Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d
1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1989); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1214 (5th Cir.
1988); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1189 (4th Cir. 1988); Sperber v. Boesky, 849
F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1988); National Enters. v. Mellon Fin. Serv. Corp., 847 F.2d 251, 254
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implicitly approved of a proximate cause requirement by allowing
recovery for direct injuries "proximately caused by the forbidden
conduct. ' e
3
A number of federal courts have refined their analyses of di-
rectness or proximity of the plaintiff's injury by examining whether
the plaintiff was the actual target or victim of the defendant's
predicate acts. Under that analysis, a plaintiff's standing will turn
on his ability to establish his status as an actual target or victim of
the predicate acts.64
2. Type of Plaintiff
An examination of the case law reveals that the grant of or
denial of standing under RICO often corresponds to the type of
plaintiff bringing the suit. The treatment commonly falls into five
separate categories of plaintiffs.
a. Creditors of RICO victims
Several different classes of creditors of RICO victims have
been denied civil RICO standing because their injuries were merely
derivative of the injuries suffered by the direct RICO victim. For
(5th Cir. 1988); Haroco, Inc., v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th
Cir. 1984), affl'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1989). But see Bankers Trust Corp v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d
1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988) ("by reason of" language contains no special standing limitation;
plaintiff only required to suffer "injury in fact"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1642 (1989).
63 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 n.15.
See, e.g., Ocean Energy II, 868 F.2d at 747 (plaintiff "clearly" target and victim of
alleged scheme); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir. 1989) (plain-
tiff lacked standing because complaint devoid of allegations of injury to business or property
by predicate acts); see also Sperber, 849 F.2d at 65 (since plaintiff was "neither the target of
the racketeering enterprise nor the competitors nor the customers of the racketeer" claims
too attenuated); Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir.
1987) (since "not a defrauded client or investor and was not a target of any of the acts
pleaded" plaintiff lacked standing); Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 713 F. Supp.
72, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (no standing as whistleblower or nonparticipant unless plaintiff was
target), aff'd, 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990).
However, another group of cases stands for the opposite proposition-that a plaintiff is
not required to have been a target or victim of the predicate acts to have standing to bring a
civil RICO suit. See, e.g., Terre du Lac Ass'n, Inc. v. Terre du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467, 472
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); Alexander Grant, 742 F.2d at 411 n.8;
Lewis v. Lhu, 696 F. Supp. 723, 727 (D.D.C. 1988); Wooten v. Loshbough, 649 F. Supp. 531,
535 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 645 F. Supp. 675, 680
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp. 1430, 1443 (N.D. Ill. 1986); SJ Ad-
vanced Technology & Mfg. Corp. v. Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572, 576 (N.D. 11l. 1986); Callan
v. State Chemical Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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example, creditors of a bankruptcy estate have been barred from
bringing a RICO claim for monies owed to the estate; only the
bankruptcy trustee has standing to pursue such a claim. 5 Simi-
larly, guarantors of corporate debt, whose primary obligor becomes
a RICO victim and defaults on its obligations, are generally denied
civil RICO standing; their injuries are considered too remote and
derivative.6
b. Shareholders of RICO victims
The requirement that RICO plaintiffs be injured in their own
business or property by a RICO violation has operated to deny
standing to shareholders who allege injury to the corporation.6
Courts have generally applied state statutory and common law to
determine whether an action is derivative or individual in nature.
An injury that falls equally on all shareholders "is a corporate as-
set, and shareholders cannot bring [suit] in their own names with-
out impairing the rights of prior claimants to such assets."66 For a
shareholder to have standing under RICO in a non-derivative ac-
tion, he must "show either an injury distinct from that to other
" See, e.g., Ocean Energy II, 868 F.2d at 746; Warren v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank,
759 F.2d 542, 545 (6th Cir. 1985); Carlton v. BAWW, Inc., 751 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1985);
Dana Molded Prods., Inc. v. Brodner, 58 Bankr. 576, 579 (N.D. Ill. 1986). But see Bankers
Trust, 859 F.2d at 1101 (debtor's creditor injured by bankruptcy fraud has standing to bring
RICO claim against debtor's officers); ANR Ltd. v. Chattin, 89 Bankr. 898, 902 (D. Utah
1988) (action against corporate insiders by creditors specifically harmed by wrongful
conduct).
6 See, e.g., Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (plain-
tiffs denied standing since harm suffered derivative of corporation's); National Enters., 847
F.2d at 255 (creditor of RICO victim typically lacks standing); Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v.
Exchange Nat'l Bank, 693 F. Supp. 666, 673 (N.D. IMI. 1988) (guarantors without standing if
merely claiming indirect injury because principal obligor suffered RICO injury); Continental
Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Windham, 668 F. Supp. 578, 585-86 (E.D. Tex. 1987)
(corporation president who guaranteed business loan lacked standing to assert corporation's
RICO claim); Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D. Utah 1986) (shareholder
derivative action inappropriate to redress corporation's injuries).
67 See, e.g., Grant, 629 F. Supp. at 573 (shareholders lack standing to assert individual
RICO claims because harm suffered derived from corporation's injury); Leach v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 860 F.2d 1266, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1988) (minority shareholders lack stand-
ing without injury distinct from corporation's), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989); see also
Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 1987) (diminution of stock
value is not personal injury distinct from that of corporation), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905
(1988); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1987) (shareholder cannot sue in
own right for injury to corporation and consequent decline in stock price affecting share-
holders generally).
" Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 987 (1986).
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shareholders or a special duty" between himself and the RICO de-
fendant.6 9 If the action is derivative, only the corporation itself or
a shareholder suing on its behalf can bring suit.70
c. Taxpayers
Taxpayer plaintiffs are generally subject to the same princi-
ples applied to shareholder plaintiffs. In Carter v. Berger,71 county
taxpayers brought suit under section 1964, seeking recovery for in-
creased taxes due to the defendant's illegal conduct. The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant's bribery of county employees permit-
ted his clients to obtain lower tax assessments for their property,
and consequently pay less taxes to the county.72 The Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's denial of standing, finding that
the taxpayers were only derivatively and indirectly injured when
the county raised their taxes due to the defendant's action.7 3 Be-
cause the taxpayers did not "act for or in the right of the county,"
their suit was rightfully dismissed.74
d. Union members
The shareholder case analysis has been used to deny standing
to union members attempting to bring RICO actions against per-
sons who allegedly committed predicate acts against the union. In
one case, the Fifth Circuit analogized union members to sharehold-
ers, and concluded that individual members of a union injured by
racketeering activity did not suffer any injury to their own prop-
erty.7 5 The court therefore held that they lacked standing because
they "suffered only indirect injuries as union members." 76
The First Circuit also relied upon the shareholder case analy-
sis to conclude that individual union members could not seek re-
dress under RICO for an injury to the union as a whole. 7 However,
the First Circuit expressly rejected use of the direct-indirect injury
" Sparling, 864 F.2d at 640.
70 Roeder v. Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1987); Rand, 794 F.2d at 849.
71 777 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985).
72 Id. at 1174.
73 Id. at 1178.
74 Id. at 1176-78.
7 See Adams-Lundy v. Association of Professional Flight Attendants, 844 F.2d 245, 250
(5th Cir. 1988).
76 Id.
7 Bass, 838 F.2d at 12-13.
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test; instead, it determined that the proper inquiry was whether
the plaintiff had "alleged an injury that 'flows from' the predicate
acts.
78
e. Whistleblowers
The conflict among the lower federal courts on the issue of
whether plaintiffs injured indirectly have civil RICO standing is
magnified in their treatment of whistleblowers-those employees
who are discharged as a result of their vocal opposition to their
employers' allegedly illegal activities . 9 Although loss of employ-
ment or employment opportunities qualifies as "injury to business
or property,"' 0 because the statute fails to mention specifically
wrongful discharge either as a predicate act81 or as a full-blown
RICO violation,82 the connection between the discharge and its
RICO-sanctioned cause is necessarily indirect.
Consequently, courts have resorted to a direct-indirect injury
analysis to determine the whistleblower's standing. A majority of
the lower courts limit standing to those plaintiffs suffering direct
injury; thus, only four district court panels have recognized the
right of whistleblowers to bring a civil RICO suit.83
3. Causation Theories Applied to Subsections of Section 1962
Civil RICO limits standing to those persons injured in their
business or property "by reason of a violation of section 1962."81
Accordingly, some courts have devised complicated standing rules
for each of section 1962's subsections. Section 1962(a) provides
that it is:
78 Id. at 12.
79 For a more technical definition and examples of whistleblowing, see Dworkin & Near,
Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 241, 243-44 (Summer 1987).
so See, e.g., Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 348 (1st Cir. 1987) (assuming "dis-
charge from employment is injury to business or property"); Acampora v. Boise Cascade
Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D.N.J. 1986) ("loss of job is clearly injury to business or prop-
erty"); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (D. Mass 1986) ("loss of employment
constitutes an injury to one's business or property") (quoting McNulty v. Borden, Inc. 474
F. Supp. 1111, 1116 (E.D. Pa. 1979)).
8 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
82 See id. § 1962.
83 See Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 641-42 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Komm v. McFlicker,
662 F. Supp. 924, 928 (W.D. Mo. 1987); Acampora, 635 F. Supp. at 69; cf. Hunt, 626 F.
Supp. at 1101.
', 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
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unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
adtivity . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.8 5
Although there is disagreement concerning the appropriate inter-
pretation of subsection (a), most courts agree that the plaintiff
must allege injury by reason of the actual investment of the rack-
eteering income.8 6 A significant minority of tourts, however, re-
quires a plaintiff only to prove injury from the underlying activity
(the predicate acts) that generated the income to be invested.8 7
Subsection (b) of section 1962 of RICO provides that it is
unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity.., to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any inter-
est in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the ac-
tivities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.8 8
A majority of courts has held that it is insufficient merely to plead
that a defendant has committed predicate acts that contribute to
the acquisition or control of an enterprise. These courts hold that a
plaintiff must demonstrate injury by reason of the acquisition or
control.8 9 Other courts echo the minority position in section
:5 Id. § 1962(a).
' See, e.g., Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 494 (6th Cir. 1990);
Quaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir..1990); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331,
357-58 (3d Cir. 1989) (most courts require allegation of "income use or investment injury");
Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir.) (plaintiff denied standing
for failing to show injury from "the use or investment of racketeering income"), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1989); Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 438,
451 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("crime lies in the use or the investment of the income derived from
that activity").
87 See, e.g., Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1990); Capalbo v.
Paine Webber Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1315, 1320-21 (N.D. IM. 1988) ("party injured by the racke-
teering activity itself should have a cause of action 'lest odd consequences result"); Avirgan
v. Hull, 691 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (D. Fla. 1988) (plaintiff can be injured by "operation of the
enterprise in which the defendant used or invested the income or proceeds"); Blue Cross v.
Nardone, 680 F. Supp. 195, 197-98 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("plaintiff can recover under 1962(a) if
"injured by the operation of the company in which defendant invested the proceeds"); Mix
v. E.F. Hutton, No. 85-3108 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
(plaintiff injured in business or property by reason of defendants violation of RICO is
sufficient).
8 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
'8 See, e.g., Litton Indus., 709 F. Supp. at 452 (plaintiff "must establish a causal con-
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1962(a) cases, holding that a plaintiff need only show injury from
the predicate acts that contributed to the violation.90
Subsection (d) of section 1962 of RICO provides that it is "un-
lawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section."91 Standing analysis
under this RICO conspiracy provision is in flux. In Torwest DBC,
Inc. v. Dick,92 the Tenth Circuit stated that "the object of a RICO
conspiracy must be to violate a substantive RICO provision," that
is, to violate either section 1962(a), (b), or (c) .9 The Tenth Circuit
later extended this logic, ruling that standing to assert a claim for
damages based upon an alleged conspiracy to violate section
1962(a) requires the plaintiff to allege injury from the use or in-
vestment of racketeering income in violation of section 1962(a).9 4
The net effect of these decisions is that section 1962(d) standing
requires the plaintiff to allege that the conspiracy functioned to
violate another subsection of section 1962 and that the plaintiff
actually has been injured by that violation.
The Second and Ninth Circuits recently have addressed the
section 1962(d) standing issue and have reached results in accord
with the Tenth Circuit. In Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House,
Inc.,95 the Second Circuit held that standing under section 1962(d)
"may be founded only upon injury from overt acts that are also
section 1961 predicate acts, and not upon any and all overt acts
furthering a RICO conspiracy." '96 The Ninth Circuit found the
nection between defendant's interest or control and its injuries"); Leonard v. Shearson Leh-
man/American Express, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 177, 181 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("plaintiff must plead
injury which he suffered as a result of 1962(a)"); P.M.F. Servs., Inc. v. Grady, 681 F. Supp.
549, 556-57 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (plaintiff "offered no authority" that defendant maintained suf-
ficient interest to satisfy statute); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Barry, 666 F. Supp. 1311, 1315
(D. Minn. 1987) ("plaintiff must allege injury 'by reason of a violation of' a substantive
RICO provision"); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49, 85-86
(D. Ohio 1986) (plaintiffs sufficiently alleges casual connection between defendant's interest
or control and plaintiff's injuries).
90 See, e.g., In re National Mortgage Equity Corp. Pool Certificates Sec. Litig., 682 F.
Supp. 1073, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (no separate standing requirement for § 1962(a) required);
Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 659 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (plaintiff
proved causation by investment).
91 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
92 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987).
93 Id. at 927 n.2 (quoting United States v. Hampton, 786 F.2d 977, 978 (10th Cir.
1986)).
" Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 76 (1989).
95 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990).
96 Id. at 25.
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Hecht reasoning persuasive, and adopted its rule in Reddy v. Lit-
ton Industries.9 7 However, a Third Circuit decision has taken a
different tack. In Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.," the court
held that standing may exist even though the plaintiff's injury was
caused by an overt act of conspiracy that was not a defined racke-
teering act.99
District courts have devised several novel approaches to the
issue. Two district court panels addressing the causation required
to sue under section 1962(d) drew analogies to common-law civil
conspiracy. At common law, a criminal conspiracy could be prose-
cuted and punished as a crime in itself, separate from the crime
that was the object of the conspiracy, because it "pose[d] distinct
dangers quite apart from those of the substantive offense."' 100 How-
ever, common-law civil conspiracy is conditioned upon the plaintiff
showing individual harm caused by the conspiracy. 0 1
Applying this rationale to the civil RICO situation, one district
court has ruled that a plaintiff must show "one or more overt acts
causing injury to the plaintiff or 'his business or property' under
section 1964(c)."' 02 Thus, "without overt acts causing injury,"
there can be no section 1964(d) violation on which to base a claim
under section 1962(c). 0 3 Another district'court has supplemented
this rule by holding that a plaintiff has standing to sue under sec-
tion 1962(d) even if the overt acts which injured him were not in
fact RICO predicate acts.0 Thus, a plaintiff proving a section
1962(d) conspiracy has standing to recover under section 1964(c) if
he can establish an injury caused by overt acts undertaken in the
course of the conspiracy.
III. IN SEARCH OF A CLEAR RULE FOR RICO STANDING
It seems fair to say that the issue of standing to bring a RICO
suit is far from settled. The United States Supreme Court has pro-
vided little guidance in this area, and as a result, the courts are far
912 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1990).
9' 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989).
9 Id. at 1166-68.
1o0 Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-79 (1975) (combination of persons in-
creases likelihood of commission of more complex and far-reaching crimes).
101 See Medallion TV Enters. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290, 1298 (D. Cal.
1986), afl'd, 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3241 (1989).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1300.
10, See Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 642 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
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from uniform in their approaches to civil RICO standing. They
have developed a variety of standing rules, which has resulted in a
restriction of the availability of the private civil RICO remedy;
that remedy, therefore, is dependent upon the circuit in which the
plaintiff's complaint is filed.
A. Proposed RICO Reforms Regarding Standing
Several commentators and legislators have proposed changes
to civil RICO. While none of their proposals is designed to deal
specifically with the issue of civil RICO standing, all of the propos-
als would affect the availability of the civil RICO remedy for indi-
vidual plaintiffs. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist has made a
general call for Congress to reduce the kinds of lawsuits-including
civil RICO actions-that can be filed in the federal courts due to
what he perceives to be a serious case overload. 105 Law professor
Norman Abrams, an advocate of limiting the availability of private
civil RICO, suggested at a May 8, 1989 conference on "Crime and
Punishment in Business Law" that the RICO statute be amended
to establish a central authority in the Department of Justice to
screen all private civil RICO claims and bar those that fail to meet
certain minimal standards. 10 6
In support of his position, Abrams noted that the purpose of
the availability of private suits under RICO is to encourage indi-
viduals to enforce the racketeering law when the government has
neither the time nor the resources to bring criminal charges based
on the same accusations-this is the so-called private attorney gen-
eral function of the RICO statute.107 However, Abrams stated that
private individuals often sue under RICO in cases in which the
lob See Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 36 (Feb. 14, 1989). In early 1989, Chief Justice
Rehnquist told the American Bar Association's House of Delegates that Congress must give
serious attention to curtailing federal jurisdiction by eliminating some of the bases for
bringing suit in federal court. See id. at 4. He included RICO actions among the five types
of civil cases, which he stated, could either be handled in state courts rather than federal
courts, or severely limited in the federal courts. See id. In a Brookings Institute conference,
the Chief Justice elaborated:
I think that the time has arrived for Congress to enact amendments to civil RICO
to limit its scope to the sort of wrongs that are connected to organized crime, or
have some other reason for being in federal court.
Rehmnquist, Get RICO Cases Out of My Courtroom, Wall St. J., May 1989, at A14, col. 4.
(emphasis added).
'" 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 5 (May 16, 1989).
107 See Adler & Cohen, Clearance of Private RICO Suits Proposed, Wall St. J., May 9,
1989, at B8, col. 1.
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government would not bring criminal charges even if it had suffi-
cient resources. In light of that fact, he suggested that his proposal
would preserve private RICO suits as a deterrent to crime, while
protecting defendants from the high cost of defending meritless
suits. 18
1. The American Bar Association
Institutional commentators also have made themselves heard.
A report issued in 1985 by an American Bar Association task force
studying civil RICO sought to determine the scope of injury for
which the civil standing provision of the statute, section 1964(c),
ought to allow a recovery. 109 Out of its concern regarding the great
amount of civil RICO litigation, the task force attempted to devise
an amendment to RICO which would clarify and limit the types of
injuries conferring civil RICO standing. After reviewing the various
positions taken by members of the bench and bar, the task force
recommended that where the RICO enterprise 110 is a perpetrator"'
of the predicate offenses, any person with injury proximately
caused by the RICO violations or the underlying criminal acts
should have standing to sue under civil' RICO. 12 The task force
proposed that "injury compensable under civil RICO should in-
clude competitive injury,"3 infiltration injury,114 injury caused by
208 Id.
109 Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 283-320.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). "Enterprise" is defined for RICO purposes as "any indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. It has been interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court as including legitimate groups as well as illegitimate "associa-
tions-in-fact." Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 24 (1983); United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
1 The meaning of "perpetrator" is clear in the case of human actors. However, the
task force considered a corporation to be a "perpetrator" for purposes of treble damages
civil RICO liability only where there was direct criminal involvement in the commission of
the predicate acts of either high-level managerial agents or top officers or directors, or where
such high-level officials or managerial agents had knowledge of the criminal activities of
their low-level agents and employees (unless the situation involved a distinct RICO injury
for which no compensation was available in claims based upon the individual criminal acts
that constituted the predicate offenses). Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 320 n.498,
364-65.
12 See Weissman, Overview of the Report of the ABA Ad Hoc Task Force On Civil
RICO, reprinted in MATHEWS, PRENTICE HALL LAW & BUSINESS FIFTH ANNUAL INSTrrTUTE:
RICO LrrIGATION UPDATE 488, 490-91 (1989).
11 See Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 292 n.449.
14 See id. at 292-93 n.450.
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the predicate offenses themselves, and any additional injury wholly
distinct from that caused directly by the predicate offenses." Be-
cause many injuries not directly caused by the predicate acts
would be included, civil RICO standing would be expanded in
those courts currently employing more restrictive tests.
Soon after the report was released, the American Bar Associa-
tion's Criminal Justice Section issued a report proposing
amendments to RICO." 5 That section's RICO Cases Committee
wrote a model state RICO statute with majority and minority com-
mentary;1 6 it directly addressed the issue of the type of injury that
could give rise to civil RICO standing. In the analog to section
1964(c), the Committee proposed the following:
(b) Any person, directly or indirectly, [sic] injured by conduct
constituting a violation by any person of the provisions of Para-
graph 6 shall, in addition to any other relief under this Subpara-
graph, have a cause action [sic] ... for threefold the actual dam-
ages he sustained. Damages shall not include pain and suffering.
Damages under this Subparagraph are not limited to competi-
tive injury or distinct injury. In an action under this Subpara-
graph, where the plaintiff substantially prevails, the plaintiff shall
also recover reasonable attorney fees in the trial and appellate
courts and costs of investigation and litigation reasonably
incurred .... 117
The proposed provision "sets out the basic authority of persons
injured to institute civil proceedings to recover for damages.""' In
its commentary upon this provision, the Committee clearly indi-
cated its desire to eliminate most court-imposed limitations on
civil RICO standing:19
The language in the provision, "direct or indirect," precludes ap-
plication of the unduly restrictive holding in Cenco, Inc. v. Seid-
man & Seidman. The Committee agrees that Alexander Grant &
Co. v. Tiffany Industries reflects an appropriate definition of the
scope of RICO-type legislation. The "direct or indirect" language
is not, however, intended to change existing law regarding proxi-
mate causation, which should be applied in civil RICO suits as in
"I See A Comprehensive Perspective on Civil and Criminal RICO Legislation and Lit-
igation, Report of the RICO Cases Committee, A.B.A. CRIM. JUSTICE SEC. 16 (1985) [herein-
after A Comprehensive Perspective].
11 See id. at 16-178 (entire text of model statute and commentaries therein).
117 Id. at 115-16 (emphasis added).
118 Id. at 116.
119 Id. at 123-25.
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other civil actions. The language in the provision, "not limited to
competitive or distinct injury," precludes the application of such
unduly restrictive limitations as the so-called "competitive" or
"distinct" injury limitations, also called "racketeering enterprise
injury," "racketeering injury," or "by reason of injury." The Com-
mittee agrees with the careful analysis rejecting those limitations
of the Seventh Circuit in Haroco and Schacht v. Brown.120
Thus, the Committee would grant standing to bring a civil
RICO suit to any person who had suffered an injury to his business
or property which was proximately caused, either directly or indi-
rectly, by any conduct prohibited by section 1962 of the federal
RICO statute. This conduct presumably includes the predicate acts
and a pattern of such acts, as well as any of the particular uses of a
pattern of such acts specifically prohibited by the section.
2. The Congress
As for the nation's legislators, the focus has been on the pri-
vate civil remedy provided under RICO. One recent RICO reform
bill, and its accompanying Senate committee report, seeks "to
eliminate its past and possible future misuse in ordinary civil dis-
putes.' 121 The bill was introduced by Senator Howard Metzen-
baum in 1987122 and was amended and favorably reported on by
the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1988.123
The bill as introduced does not specifically address the kind of
causation that ought to be required for civil RICO standing. It
does, however, seek to amend RICO's civil standing provision by
eliminating treble damages in most civil RICO cases-an action
which would make the civil RICO remedy much less appealing to
plaintiffs. The committee sought the passage of this bill "to facili-
tate the use of civil RICO by the Government and consumers who
sustain injury due to organized criminal conduct or white-collar
crime proscribed by RICO and to discourage the misuse of civil
120 Id. at 123-24 (citing Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982)); see Haroco, Inc., v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust, 747
F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Alexander Grant, 742 F.2d at 413;
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983)).
... STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100th CONG., 2D SESS., AMENDING THE
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS AcT 2 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinaf-
ter SENATE COMM.].
122 S. 1523, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S10,501 (1987).
123 SENATE Co~til., supra note 121, at 7.
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RICO in ordinary civil disputes. ' 124 By "detrebling the relief recov-
erable," the bill attempted to curb the frivolous use of the civil
RICO statute. It retained an actual damages, costs, and fees rem-
edy "for those who are injured by conduct prohibited by RICO."''1 5
These remarks and the actual provisions of the bill, as
approved for passage by the committee, seem to evince an intent
to limit those who would have standing to bring a private civil
RICO action. However, the only change proposed in the actual lan-
guage of section 1964(c) is from giving a remedy to "any person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of sec-
tion 1962 of this chapter" (the current wording of the standing
provision), to language giving a remedy to either a "governmental
entity" or "[a] person whose business or property is injured by
conduct in violation of section 1962 of this title."'26
The bill was later blocked by lawmakers concerned with provi-
sions which sought to apply it retroactively to pending RICO
suits.127 However, a nearly identical bill was introduced in the
House on February 22, 1989,128 and in the Senate on February 23,
1989.129 Known together as the RICO Reform Act of 1989, these
two pieces of legislation seek to limit the scope of civil RICO by
retroactively limiting treble damages actions to cases brought by
federal, state, and local governments, and those in which a defend-
ant already has been convicted of a RICO violation, the commis-
sion of a predicate act, or a state or federal felony growing out of
the course of conduct alleged in the RICO complaint. 130
In February of 1990, the Senate version of the bill was ap-
proved by the Senate Judiciary Committee.' The House Judici-
124 Id. at 3; Weissman, supra note 112, at 524.
25 SENATE COMM., supra note 120, at 5.
126 S. 1523, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S10,502 (1987).
127 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 1-2 (Oct. 18, 1988).
28 H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H369 (1989); 4 Civ. RICO Rep.
(BNA) No. 38, at 2 (Feb. 28, 1989).
129 S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S1642 (1989); 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA)
No. 38, at 2 (Feb. 28, 1989).
120 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 2 (Feb. 28, 1989). The legislation would also
eliminate treble damages where state or federal securities laws provide a remedy for the
type of conduct on which the case is based except in certain instances, such as cases involv-
ing allegations of insider trading. Plaintiffs in business and commercial lawsuits could still
bring civil RICO claims, but would be entitled to recover only actual damages. Consumers,
victims of insider trading, and government agencies would be allowed to bring lawsuits for
fraud and recover actual damages plus discretionary punitive damages of up to twice the
actual damages in limited situations. Id.
1 McMillan, Push for RICO Reform Continues, 76 A.B.A. J. 109 (April 1990).
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ary Committee approved H.R. 5111, sponsored by William T.
Hughes, chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
in September of 1990.132 Two amendments, one that would pre-
clude the application of the Bill to pending cases, and one that
mitigates the impact of the bill's "gatekeeper provision" to civil
RICO suits over failed savings and loan institutions, were adopted
by the committee. 133 It remains to be seen whether this bill will
pass in the entire House.
B. A Proposed Causation Requirement for Civil RICO Standing
An amendment to civil provisions of RICO appears to be the
only viable alternative to resolve judicial confusion regarding the
type of causation required to confer civil RICO standing on private
plaintiffs. It should explicitly adopt what is implicit in Sedima:
that persons injured, either directly or indirectly, by violations of
the statute have standing to file a civil suit under section 1964(c),
provided that their injuries are proximately caused by those viola-
tions. Moreover, the amendment should indicate precisely that
standing is present whether the person is injured by the commis-
sion of a predicate act or acts, by the pattern of these predicate
racketeering act or acts, or by the particular use of the pattern of
racketeering activity explicitly prohibited in one of the subsections
of section 1962. Plaintiffs injured by efforts to facilitate, cover up,
or perpetuate such activity should also have standing to sue under
civil RICO.
Under such a rule, a plaintiff would have standing to bring a
treble damages suit if he could allege and ultimately prove that his
injury was proximately caused (a) by one or more of the predicate
criminal offenses included in RICO's definition of "racketeering ac-
tivity"; 3 4 or (b) by a "pattern of racketeering activity" made up of
two or more of these criminal offenses occurring after the effective
date of the Act and within ten years of each other;135 or (c) by the
acquisition, establishment, operation, or maintenance of an enter-
prise in interstate commerce through a pattern of racket-
132 House Judiciary Committee Approves Legislation to Curb RICO, Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 12, at 468 (September 24, 1990).
133 Id. "The 'gatekeeper' test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate either that the de-
fendant has already been criminally convicted for conduct underlying the civil claim, or that
civil RICO treble damages are needed to deter further 'egregious conduct.'" Id.
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) (definition of "racketeering activity").
35 Id. § 1961(5).
1990]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
eering activity; or (d) by a conspiracy to acquire, establish, operate,
or maintain an enterprise in interstate commerce through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity.13 6 Other activities, such as a retalia-
tory discharge, designed to contribute to the success of the defend-
ant's racketeering scheme, would also give rise to standing to bring
a treble damages suit.
The proposed amendment would read as follows:
(c) Any person suffering an injury to his business or property
which is proximately caused by an act of "racket-
eering activity," as defined in section 1961(1) of this chapter; a
"pattern of racketeering activity," as defined in section 1961(5) of
this chapter; or a "prohibited activity," as defined in section 1962
of this chapter; may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee. Such proximate causation shall also include actions designed
to facilitate, conceal, or perpetuate any act of "racketeering activ-
ity," "pattern of racketeering activity," or "prohibited activity,"
as enumerated above, despite the fact that such facilitation, con-
cealment, or perpetuation is not itself a violation of this chapter.
The use of a proximate cause standard has wide support; the judi-
ciary and at least two bar association groups favor it."3 7
The Fourth Circuit, in Brandenburg v. Seidel,13 8 wrote an ex-
cellent exposition of the nature and propriety of using a proximate
cause inquiry to determine civil RICO standing:
[A] cause-in-fact connection, standing alone, does not suffice to
establish liability. Civil RICO is of course a statutory tort rem-
edy-simply one with particularly drastic remedies. Causation
principles generally applicable to tort liability must be considered
applicable. These require not only cause-in-fact, but 'legal' or
'proximate' cause as well, the latter involving a policy rather than
a purely factual determination: 'whether the conduct has been so
significant and important a cause that the defendant should be
136 See id. § 1962(a)-(d).
137 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts' promulga-
tion of proximate cause standard). For example, the Second Circuit has asserted that "legal
liability should not extend as far as factual causation," and "that both direct and indirect
injuries must be proximately caused." Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1988).
The court also acknowledged that cause-in-fact and foreseeability were necessary but not
sufficient to establish proximate cause, noting that the question of proximate cause also
involved "social policy decisions based on shared principles of justice." Id. at 65.
138 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988).
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held responsible.'. . . As such, the legal cause determination is
properly one of law for the court, taking into consideration such
factors as the foreseeability of the particular injury, the interven-
tion of other independent causes, and the factual directness of
the causal connection. 139
In conjunction with the proximate cause inquiry, a court will also
have to determine the precise type of RICO violation giving rise to
civil RICO standing. Though there has been some confusion to
date in the courts as to whether the plaintiff must allege injury
from the predicate acts, from the pattern of predicate acts, or from
a specific violation of section 1962 of the RICO statute, the Sedima
Court assumed that injuries beyond those caused by the predicate
acts were actionable-that damages other than those directly at-
tributable to the fraudulent acts themselves would be
recoverable. 140
RICO, under the proposed amendment, would ensure that
anyone injured by a defendant's racketeering activity, attempted
racketeering activity, or efforts to facilitate, cover up, or perpetu-
ate racketeering activity, has a remedy. This result comports with
Congress' directive that the provisions of the RICO statute "shall
be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.''
CONCLUSION
The issue of when a plaintiff is injured "by reason of" a RICO
violation in a manner sufficient to confer upon him civil RICO
standing continues to bedevil the federal courts. The United States
Supreme Court appears unresponsive, as does the RICO reform
legislation currently before Congress. Therefore, an amendment to
the statute specifically designed to spell out the type of causation
sufficient for civil RICO standing is both necessary and appropri-
ate. The proposed amendment would ensure redress for business
and property injuries proximately caused by a wide variety of rack-
Id. at 1189 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 42, at 272 (5th ed. 1984).
140 Sedima, 473 U.S. 479, 497 & n.15). An American Bar Association task force has also
taken an expansive view of the racketeering injuries which give rise to civil RICO standing,
stating that "injury compensable under civil RICO should include competitive injury, infil-
tration injury, injury caused by the predicate offenses themselves, and any additional injury
wholly distinct from that caused directly by the predicate offenses." Task Force Report,
supra note 16, at 320.
141 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1990)).
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eteering behaviors. Moreover, the amendment would stem the tide
of judicial restrictions on the availability of the private civil RICO
remedy.
